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Abstract
This article demonstrates how attributes of policy fields shape parliamentary oversight
across policy fields. Building on the accountability literature, the study develops the argu-
ment that parliamentarians will more likely oversee policy fields where cooperative forms
of governance are more present, since these policies are more difficult to assess and have a
higher need of legitimation. Using the example of policy evaluation demand by members of
parliament in Switzerland, the study suggests that parliamentarians seek more control in a
policy field, where public activities are more often delegated to non-public actors or the need
for legitimation is particularly high. Both effects increase with the policy field’s closeness
to science. These findings could be very relevant in order to understand how attributes of
policy fields shape political institutions.
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1 Introduction
Accountability and its importance for contemporary democracies has been widely discussed in
literature, especially in the relationship between parliaments and governments (Strøm, Müller
and Bergman, 2006; Olsen, 2015). In doing so, the question of how parliaments execute their
oversight function has attracted growing interest lately (Karlas, 2012; Winzen, 2012; Stapenhurst
and Pelizzo, 2012; Blom-Hansen, 2013). However, these studies often ignore that parliamentary
oversight might vary across policy fields, since policy fields differ in their institutional settings,
involved actors and available resources. Indeed, several studies for the European Union show
that accountability varies across agencies and policy areas (Egeberg and Trondal, 2011; Koop,
2011; Hanretty and Koop, 2012; Font and Durán, 2016). Given the different natures of policy
fields, this study considers the question of why members of parliament (MPs) aim to oversee
some policy fields more frequently than others.
This paper argues that policy fields are shaped by policy attributes, which influence the MPs’
need for accountability differently. In general, the demand for accountability has increased in
the last couple of decades, since the implementation process of many policy fields has changed
fundamentally (Benz et al., 2007). While policies used to be implemented top-down by agencies,
they are nowadays more often realized through private organizations within policy networks. The
article develops the argument that the implementation process within policy networks leads to
different needs of parliamentary oversight. In policy fields where cooperative forms of governance
are more present, the need for accountability is higher, since the MPs have more difficulties to
oversee such processes and have stronger incentives to control those areas (Papadopoulos, 2007).
The study examines the hypotheses that the extent of delegation and legitimation in a policy
field influences the MPs’ likelihood to execute parliamentary oversight.
These arguments are analyzed by using the example of parliamentary requests demanding
a policy evaluation in Switzerland. Several studies have recently shown that parliamentary re-
quests or questions are used by the parliament in order to oversee the government and its agencies
(Russo and Wiberg, 2010; Proksch and Slapin, 2011; Martin and Rozenberg, 2014). Parliamen-
tary requests have a particularly important role for parliamentary oversight in Switzerland,
since Swiss MPs are not fully professionalized and the oversight capacities are rather weak by
comparison. Moreover, evaluations are particularly interesting for MPs to demand within par-
liamentary requests, as they assess the effectiveness or efficiency of a policy in a systematic and
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transparent way (Widmer and DeRocchi, 2012, 14). According to Author (2016), evaluations
do not only provide information for evidence-based policy making, but also help MPs to fulfill
their oversight function towards the government. During evaluations, agencies have to provide
information on the policy implementation process to the parliament. Hence, evaluations are an
effective tool for MPs in order to hold the government accountable (Pollitt, 2006).
Empirically, the article analyzes a survey that was conducted amongst the Swiss MPs at the
national and subnational level in 2014. In order to obtain information about their motivation
for demanding policy evaluations, the MPs were asked about the role of evaluations within their
parliament. Moreover, an expert survey amongst Swiss political scientists provides additional
information about policy fields’ attributes. Investigating legislative oversight by parliamentary
requests, Switzerland is a particularly interesting case. On the one hand, the most common
parliamentary requests can be found in the Swiss parliaments (Wiberg, 1995, 187-188). On the
other hand, focusing on evaluation demand, the country does not only have a relatively high
evaluation culture, but it also has the most developed institutionalization of evaluation within
the parliament (Jacob, Speer and Furubo, 2015, 19).
This article demonstrates that a MPs’ demand for accountability indeed varies across policy
fields. In doing so, MPs interpret their oversight role differently depending on the policy field.
In those policy fields where more public activities are delegated to private organizations or the
need for legitimation is particularly high, MPs are more likely to demand an evaluation, since
the need for accountability is higher. Both effects increase with the policy fields’ closeness to
science. The findings support the argument that policy fields’ attributes have an important
impact on how MPs fulfill their parliamentary oversight in a specific policy field.
The next sections are structured as follows: First, section 2 discusses how the change in policy
implementation has affected accountability. Section 3 illustrates the parliamentary oversight in-
stitutions in Switzerland. Section 4 develops the argument and hypotheses. Section 5 introduces
data and methods, together with the operationalization. Then section 6 presents the results of
the analysis. Section 7 discusses implications for other countries and oversight institutions. 8
concludes the results and discusses the relevance of the findings for further research.
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2 Policy Implementation and Accountability
The organization of policy implementation has gone through a fundamental change in the last
fifty years (Benz et al., 2007). During the 1960s, policy makers were convinced that the ad-
ministration could plan the policy implementation from top down. However, Pressman and
Wildavsky (1984) showed that this way of implementation did not work, since the administra-
tion units did not necessarily implement a policy within the meaning of the policy maker. In
doing so, the administration units are influenced by a complex set-up of individual and collec-
tive actors, which have varying interests. The literature often argues that modern societies have
slightly shifted from government to governance (Mayntz, 2006; Sager et al., 2014).1 Governance
can be referred to as a circumstance, in which collective decisions are made in non-hierarchical
independence between public and private actors. Within the so-called cooperative governance,
the state does not pursue a sovereign position, but rather tries to steer policy networks indirectly
and imperfectly when it seems appropriate (Rhodes, 1997, 53).
However, the policy implementation by networks, involving public actors and non-public
actors, entails problems of accountability. According to Bovens (2007, 470), accountability is
defined as "a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to
explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pose judgment, and
the actor may face consequences". In doing so, cooperative governance is not primarily designed
for democratization of policy making, but for a solution to functional problems. Papadopoulos
(2007, 473-483) identifies four problems of accountability caused by cooperative governance:
First, policy networks have a weak visibility. Decisions within policy networks tend to be in-
formal and the responsibility is shared amongst a large number of actors (Bovens, 1998). Since
policy networks are often uncoupled from the public authorities, the capacity for the admin-
istration units to oversee the networks’ activities is complicated. Second, policy networks are
typically composed of various actors, such as bureaucrats, policy experts, and interest repre-
sentatives. Indeed, public servants are accountable to the government, but this administrative
accountability is less pronounced than in other relationships (Christiansen, 1997). Furthermore,
policy experts and interest representatives are even less accountable. Third, policy networks
consist of complex structures on multiple levels where decisions are made across levels (Hooghe
1The literature usually distinguishes between two different definitions of governance. Governance can either
be understood as the opposing model to government or as all possible forms of governing (Bevir, 2013). This
article refers to the first understanding.
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and Marks, 2003). Negotiations across levels are often more informal and impede accountability,
as these are usually not publicly accessible. Last, relations between actors in policy networks
also cause problems with accountability. A peer accountability rises within a policy network
when participants of policy networks evaluate their counterparts (Grant and Keohane, 2005).
Particularly when the composition of policy networks does not change over time, there is a cer-
tain probability that participants may be more accountable to their negotiation partners than
towards the public.
Public administration literature on third-party governance has mainly debated about to
what extent policy networks can be made accountable (Posner, 2002; Koliba, Mills and Zia,
2011). However, the lack of accountability in cooperative governance not only affects the public
administration, but also the parliament. In doing so, policy implementation within policy net-
works tightens the problem of parliamentary oversight due to agency problems. Naturally in all
democracies, agency problems occur between the parliament and the administration. According
to Strøm (2000, 266), the policy process can described as a chain of delegation, in "which those
authorized to make political decisions conditionally designate others to make such decisions in
their name and place". In a legislative-executive relationship, MPs pass bills and delegate their
implementation to the administration. The delegation process generates a principal-agent rela-
tionship between the parliament and the administration (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991). The
parliament (principal) commissions the agency (agent) to implement the policy in exchange for
a reward (financial and personal resources). Since an agency may have other interests than
the parliament (bureaucratic drift) and it may also have an information advantage (information
asymmetry), the MPs cannot be sure that the administration implements the public policies in
their sense. Hence, the problems of bureaucratic drift and information asymmetry give the MPs
incentives to oversee the government (Lupia, 2003, 44).
The way in which policies are implemented is crucial for MPs. If they cannot be sure whether
the legislation is implemented in their favor, then they might feel that their personal goals are
jeopardized. Several studies have argued that MPs are mainly driven by reelection and good
public policy (Mayhew, 1974). While reelection depends on the public perception of the MP’s
performance within the parliament, good public policy relies on the assumption that the policy
is implemented according to the MP’s interpretation. On the one hand, voters will not reelect
MPs if they have the impression that the politicians did not keep their promises. On the other
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hand, a public policy will - from a MPs’ point of view - not be good if it is not implemented
according to the parliament. Since the policy implementation is so important for MPs to achieve
their goals, the parliamentary oversight takes an eminent role for their mandate.
3 Parliamentary Oversight in Switzerland
Parliamentary oversight can have different forms of institutional design. Kiewiet and McCubbins
(1991, 27) identify four key methods how parliaments may oversee the government with its
agencies: Contract design, screening and selection, monitoring and reports, and institutional
checks. While the first two categories apply before the delegation process (ex ante mechanism),
the latter two appear thereafter (ex post mechanism).
In Switzerland, monitoring and reporting as well as institutional checks dominate the parlia-
mentary oversight. In doing so, they are institutionally organized through oversight committees.
While the control committees scrutinize the conduct of business by the government and the agen-
cies, the finance committees exercise the supervisory control over the finances of the executive.
In doing so, they carry out investigations as well as inspections and review the annual and man-
agement reports, which they sum up in written reports with recommendations for the attention
of the government. However, the strength of those reports is restricted since the parliaments
have limited institutional control capacities. According to (Schnapp and Harfst, 2005), the Swiss
federal parliament especially lacks in structures and legal basis for controlling the government,
which is essential in order to investigate the government. Unsurprisingly, the committees’ re-
ports are often affectless, as the governments often do not respond to their recommendations
(Mastronardi, 1990, 139-141).
Since the institutions of parliamentary oversight are limited in Switzerland, MPs have to
resort to other means. Recent studies have pointed out the importance of parliamentary requests
and in particular of parliamentary oversight (Russo and Wiberg, 2010; Proksch and Slapin,
2011; Jensen, Proksch and Slapin, 2013; Martin and Rozenberg, 2014). This is particularly
eminent in Switzerland, where a rich variety of parliamentary instruments are at the parliaments’
disposal and the use of parliamentary requests has more than doubled in the last twenty years
(Vatter, 2014, 298). In general, parliamentary requests enable MPs to propose new policies or
to obtain information on specific issues. In doing so, parliamentary requests can be submitted
by individual MPs, a parliamentary group or a committee. Usually they are signed by several
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Note: The figure illustrates the number of parliamentary requests as well as monitoring and reporting in-
struments at the federal level between 2003 and November 29th, 2015. Instruments are listed according to their
frequency. Reports include evaluations by the Parliamentary Control of the Administration. Supervisions are
investigations that are based on leads by a third party. Visits refer to official inspections of agencies by the
oversight committees. Source: Parlamentsdienste der eidgenössischen Räte (2015); Geschäftsprüfungskommissio-
nen der eidgenössischen Räte (2015).
MPs, but most of the time only one MP initiated the request (Author 2016b). As a consequence,
the requests require very little preparation time, which is why they barely have any costs for
MPs (Bailer, 2011). This is particularly important for Swiss MPs, since they rarely ever have
personal assistants and the party offices are relatively small. Figure 1 shows that parliamentary
requests appear more frequently than monitoring and reporting instruments, which are produced
by the oversight committees.
In order to oversee the government, MPs may not only ask questions, but also demand
policy evaluations. The request can directly ask for an evaluation or it can be designed in such a
way that the executive decides to carry out an evaluation in order to answer the parliamentary
proposal. In any case, the government shall pass the initiative to the responsible department or
agency, which carries out the evaluation. Evaluations have the advantage that the government
has to conduct a profound investigation in order to satisfy the parliamentary request, whilst
a question can often be answered with a short response. During an evaluation, agencies have
to make their actions transparent and provide information for stakeholders and particularly
for parliaments. As a consequence, MPs do not only obtain information on how a policy was
implemented, but also whether the policy was effective or efficient. By using a parliamentary
request, parliaments can react to short-dated events and do not have to monitor all the activities
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of the agencies, which is what they generally prefer (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984).
Hence, policy evaluations are frequently used to establish accountability in policy networks.
While hearings and inspections are difficult and costly to establish with non-public actors, eval-
uations are an efficient instrument to oversee the policy implementation within policy networks.
In doing so, the delegation of an evaluation to the agencies has appealing characteristics for
MPs. Evaluation reports that are commissioned by the government are not only an opportunity
for MPs to outsource the cost of producing policy expertise, but also to obtain authoritative and
objective information. During the evaluation report, the contracted evaluators get access to all
kind of information that helps them to understand the policy implementation and overcome the
weak visibility of policy networks, as they have easier access to non-governmental policy experts
and interest representatives.
However, the policy process differs across the policy fields, which is why the MPs have
different incentives to fulfill their oversight function. Depending on the policy fields’ attributes,
they will submit more parliamentary requests in order to demand an evaluation in some policy
fields than in others. Hence, the next section provides an explanation why some policy fields
have a higher need for accountability than others.
4 Varieties of Accountability Across Policy Fields
Policy fields - also referred to in literature as policy areas, sectors, or domains - cover a certain
group of policies, which have a similar social scope. They may be compared to what some
authors refer to as policy subsystems (Sabatier, 1998). A policy subsystem consists of public
and private actors who are interested in a policy problem or issue, and who regularly seek to
influence a public policy in a domain. In doing so, they differ not only in their context (actors,
size, resources), but also in their nature. As a consequence, policy fields are political arenas in
which the political actors find different conditions for behaving.
Variation across policy fields is nothing new to public policy literature. For instance, Lowi
(1972) distinguishes four types of policies - distributive, redistributive, constituent, and reg-
ulative policy - which shape the political arena by influencing the relationships between the
political actors. Moreover, Baumgartner and Jones (2010) characterize the policy field in the
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) as the arena where change happens. In doing so, policy
fields are characterized by long terms of stability and are only punctuated by short, but severe
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terms of crisis in which large-scale changes occur, which are caused by destabilizing events or
by the accumulation of unaddressed grievances. Since those events do not affect all policy fields
at the same time, we can observe policy change in some areas, but not in others. This is partly
also true for parliamentary oversight. In doing so, policy fields have certain conditions for the
need of accountability, which is the fundamental incentive for MPs to control the agency.
In the following, this section argues that two different characteristics of policy fields influence
the need for accountability: The extent of delegation and the need for legitimation. While the
extent of delegated public services is purely descriptive and affects the accessibility of parlia-
mentary oversight, the need for legitimation is rather based on values and determines the MPs’
motivation to oversee the policy field. First, the delegation of the execution of public activities
to civil organizations is an important attribute of cooperative governance (Widmer, 2008). In
doing so, the administration delegates parts or a full public service to private organizations,
which are responsible for their provision. This process has a lot of advantages, since private
organizations are often able to provide a public service with fewer resources or possess know-
how to provide a better service. However, the delegation of public services also entails perils.
The implementation process of a public policy that is delegated often lacks in accountability,
since the implementation process is uncoupled by the administration and executed by a private
organization, which does not necessarily have the need to be accountable to the public. More-
over, such an implementation is more difficult to oversee for the parliament, which is why the
MPs have stronger incentives to fulfill their oversight function. Several studies have observed
a higher evaluation activity in those policy fields that delegate more public activities to such
actors (Verhoest, Verschuere and Bouckaert, 2007; Widmer, 2008). I argue, that in those policy
areas where the administration delegates a noticeable amount of public activities to non-public
actors, the MPs are more likely to demand an evaluation in order to overcome the accountability
problem of the policy implementation process:
H1: The more public services are delegated to non-public organizations in a policy field, the more
likely a MP will demand an evaluation with parliamentary requests in this policy field.
Second, shifts from government to cooperative governance have consequences for the legitimacy
of the state activities (Van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004). According to Scharpf (1999,
7-13), legitimacy can either be the procedures that allow the people to influence political de-
cisions (input legitimacy) or the capacity of the political system to produce effective outcomes
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(output legitimacy). It has been argued in literature, that policy networks are supposed to
increase input legitimacy, since it includes the citizens in the processes of public policies (Benz,
1994). However, those policy networks may cause output legitimacy deficits, especially when
democratic accountability is missing. From the perspective of a parliament - a key institution of
input legitimacy - cooperative governance structure must not necessarily enjoy high output le-
gitimacy. In general, a public policy is accepted and supported by the population when a policy
can solve a problem of the society. Actors within policy networks are not always accountable
to the public, but often represent other interests. The less accountable the policy implemen-
tation in a policy field is, the more the parliament will have the need to have those activities
legitimated. Widmer (2009, 354-355) argues that evaluations can play an important role for
the output legitimacy since they indicate which policies are effective and thus can contribute
to the solution of a problem. Evaluations can legitimate a public policy ex post proving the
rightness of a decision (Majone, 1996; Weiss, 1998). Hence, I argue that in those policy fields
where the need to legitimate policy outputs is high, MPs will demand more evaluations in order
to inform themselves about the performance of policy networks and to ensure that policies are
implemented in their meaning:
H2: The higher the need to legitimate policy outputs in a policy field, the more likely a MP will
demand an evaluation with parliamentary requests in this policy field.
The next section introduces the data and the methods that the study uses in order to demon-
strate how policy attributes influence the parliamentary oversight by Swiss MPs.
5 Data and Methods
In order to analyze the variation of evaluation demand across policy fields, the article uses
data of an online survey amongst Swiss MPs at the national and subnational level, which was
conducted during May and June 2014 (Author et al. 2014). The MPs were asked about their
relationship to evaluation.2 In doing so, the survey provided the MPs with a list of policy fields
that they could select from. In order to reduce the complexity for the MPs, ten policy fields were
identified on the basis of the Swiss corpus juris. In addition, the policy fields were supplemented
2Since MPs have a rather broad understanding of an evaluation, the survey gave a definition in the introduction:
"In this survey, evaluations are interpreted as studies, reports or other documents, which assess a state’s measure
in a systematic and transparent way with respect to their effectiveness, efficiency or fitness for purpose."
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with specific key words that illustrated the different areas within a policy field.3 In total, 1570
MPs participated in the survey, which comes up to a response rate of 55.3% (N=2841).
Next to the attributes delegation and legitimation, the study also considered the policy field’s
attributes salience, closeness to science, and conflictivity, which are based on different studies
about research on evaluation (Weiss, 1999; Haarich and del Castillo, 2004; Frey, 2010; Pattyn,
2014). The data on the policy fields’ attributes was gathered by an expert survey with Swiss
political scientists in order to obtain information on the attributes of a policy field.4 Hooghe
et al. (2010, 692) suggests that expert surveys are appropriate if reliable information can rather
be found with experts than in reliable documentary sources. Since no data is available for the
policy fields’ attributes in Switzerland, the experts were asked to rate the attributes of the
different policy fields. In doing so, the survey provided the same list of policy fields with key
words that were included in the survey amongst the Swiss MPs. Moreover, the survey defined
the policy fields’ attributes and asked the experts to rank the attribute on a scale between
0 and 10.5 In order to compare the expert’s ratings with each other, the ratings have been
standardized. In doing so, the values have been rescaled to a standard deviation of one and a
mean of zero. Figure 2 illustrates the variation across the policy fields. Not only do the different
attributes vary within a policy field, but they also differ across the policy fields. Moreover,
the figure shows that the answers of the experts range within a certain spectrum, with some
exceptions.
As the study focuses on the differences between the policy fields, the database has been
stacked (Van der Eijk et al., 2006). A stacked data set is a matrix that derives from a normal
one, the units of analysis do not represent a single MP, but MP×policy field combinations. In
this data matrix, each MP is represented by as many cases as there are policy fields. For every
policy field, an entry is generated that indicates whether a MP has submitted a parliamentary
request in a certain policy field. This allows us to distinguish between policy fields instead of
MPs.
The analysis aims to answer the question of whether a parliament has demanded an eval-
uation in a policy field. In doing so, MPs were asked if they had submitted a parliamentary
request in the last four years in order to investigate a public policy regarding its effectiveness
3A full list of the policy fields with the key words can be found in the Appendix (Table 2).
4The invited political scientists study Swiss politics and have also completed their PhD. The survey was
conducted during April 2015 and generated a response rate of 68.9% (N=31).
5The definitions of the policy fields’ attributes can be found in the Appendix (Table 3).
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Figure 2: Distribution of Attributes across Policy Fields
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or efficiency, and if so, in which policy field. The dependent variable "parliamentary request in
policy field" is coded with 0 (no request) and 1 (request). The independent variables delegation,
legitimation, salience, conflictivity, and closeness of science are rated on a standardized scale
between -2 (low) and 2 (high). In order to control for the institution dimension of a policy field,
a variable is included that indicates the public expenditure of a policy field. Since the attributes
of policy fields partly correlate, the variables are separated in the models and are combined in
interaction terms in order to avoid multicollinearity (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006).6
Moreover, several other control variables on the individual and parliament level are tested.
On the MP level, age, sex, level of education, party membership, member of an opposition
party7, parliament experience, membership in the parliament board, membership in an oversight
committee, as well as the attitude towards evaluation. On the parliament level, the models
include the size of the parliament, if the canton/federation knows a general evaluation clause8
in the constitution, and the institutional position of the parliament9 towards the government.10
Since the data is structured in three different levels (MP, policy field, and parliament), I
6The covariance matrix of the policy fields’ attributes is illustrated in the Appendix (Table 4).
7The canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden is characterized by a high percentage of nonpartisan MPs and govern-
ment members, which however share common values (Vatter, 2002, 183). Since the members of opposition parties
could not have really been determined, Appenzell Innerrhoden was excluded from the analysis.
8An evaluation clause is a passage in the bill that usually urges the government to evaluate a policy after a
certain time. General evaluation clauses in the cantonal/federal constitution do not refer to a specific policy, but
demand the government to frequently evaluate its policies (Bussmann, 2005, 97-99).
9Kaiss (2010) has built an index in order to identify the institutional position of parliament towards the
government. The index is based on the three main functions of the parliament: election, legislation, and oversight.
From the 17 indicators, I only included those that are relevant for parliamentary oversight.
10The operationalization is summarized in the Appendix (Table 5).
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use a multi-level model in order conduct the analysis (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). In doing
so, a random intercept model tests variables on all three levels. In addition, the outcome of
the endogenous variable is binary, which is why I will use a logistic regression model. The
following three level model is used to estimate the likelihood to demand an evaluation with a
parliamentary request:
Yijk = γ000 + v0k + u0jk + eijk (1)
where Y is the likelihood to demand an evaluation at the levels i (MP), j (parliament) and k
(policy field), while γ000 stands for the random intercepts. In addition, v0k as well as u0jk refer
to the overall regression slopes, and eijk the random residual error terms at the three levels.
6 Results
During the survey, the MPs were asked whether they submitted a parliamentary request in order
to examine a state measure in the last four years. If so, they had to specify in which policy field
they proposed the parliamentary request. In total, 717 MPs (49% of the sample) submitted a
parliamentary request in order to demand an evaluation. Although this percentage is relatively
high, one has to consider that MPs can submit parliamentary requests by other members or
with a whole committee. Moreover, not all parliamentary requests are successfully submitted
to the government, since they do not find a majority in the parliament.
According to Figure 3, the distribution of evaluation demand differs highly across the policy
fields. The MPs have most often submitted parliamentary requests in the policy fields of infras-
tructure, education, and public finances. In contrast, the fewest parliamentary requests were
submitted in the policy fields of justice/migration, security/foreign affairs, and energy. In doing
so, MPs have different preferences in the selection of the policy field. While MPs from right
parties indicated to demand more evaluations in the policy field of justice/migration and econ-
omy, MPs from left parties proposed more requests in the policy field of welfare. Compared to
the findings of previous studies on evaluation activity across policy fields, MPs tend to demand
more evaluations in the field of infrastructure and public finances. In contrast, less evaluations
are requested in the area of economy.
In order to investigate the variation of evaluations across policy fields, four different models
are tested (Table 1). Model 1 tests the explanatory strength of the policy fields’ attribute
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In the last four years, in which policy fields did you propose a parliamentary request in order to
examine a state measure with regard to implementation and impact?
delegation. The model illustrates that the extent of delegation of a policy field has a significant
influence on the probability to demand an evaluation in a policy field. In addition, the level
of salience and the budget of a policy field also influence the parliamentary demand for an
evaluation. The same is true or several variables on the individual level. In doing so, they indicate
that MPs demand evaluations in order to fulfill their oversight function. Members of oversight
committees and opposition parties have a significantly higher probability to demand evaluations.
Moreover, the age, the experience of an MP as well as the membership in a parliamentary board
also increase the likelihood for a parliamentary request. Regarding the party ideology, pole
parties (Social Democrats, Greens, Swiss People’s Party) also seem to demand more evaluations.
In contrast, factors on the parliament level do not seem to influence the likelihood of demanding
an evaluation. Model 2 includes the interaction term between delegation and science. The
model shows that the effect is not only more significant, but also has a higher influence on the
probability to demand an evaluation. The more evaluations are delegated in a policy field and
the closer the policy field is to science, the more likely a member of parliament will demand
an evaluation. Model 3 includes the variable legitimation. In contrast to delegation, the need
to legitimate public activities only has a weakly significant influence to submit a parliamentary
request in a policy field. However, if we build the interaction term with science, the effect gets
substantially stronger and also becomes highly significant (Model 4).
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Table 1: Individual, Policy Field, and Parliament Random Effects Models
(1404 MPs, 10 Policy Fields, 27 Parliaments)
Dependent variable: Parliamentary Request








Legitimation × Science 0.941∗∗∗
(0.336)
Salience −0.337∗∗∗ −0.384∗∗∗ −0.400∗∗∗ −0.405∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.072) (0.087) (0.074)
Budget 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Individual Level
Age 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Men 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Education 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Center Party −0.155∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Opposition 0.176∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.012) (0.063) (0.063)
Experience 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Parliament Board 0.156∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.156∗∗
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Oversight Committee 0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Evaluation Attitude 0.493∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Parliament Level
Parliament Size −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Evaluation Clause 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.027
(0.108) (0.106) (0.109) (0.108)
Institutional Position 0.247 0.250 0.243 0.248
(0.310) (0.310) (0.311) (0.310)
Intercept −4.734∗∗∗ −4.717∗∗∗ −4.673∗∗∗ −4.653∗∗∗
(0.307) (0.307) (0.311) (0.309)
Residual Variance
Between φ (Parliaments) 0.213 0.213 0.214 0.214
Between φ (Policy Fields) 0.236 0.233 0.238 0.231
Observations 14,040 14,040 14,040 14,040
Log Likelihood -4,839.194 -4,838.170 -4,839.889 -4,837.481
Wald χ2 291.25∗∗∗ 293.10∗∗∗ 289.41∗∗∗ 294.56∗∗∗
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Regression coefficients shown with robust standard biases in
parentheses.
15
The results suggest that accountability seems to influence the extent of parliamentary over-
sight in the policy fields. First, the policy fields’ attributes delegation and legitimation influence
the MP’s likelihood to demand an evaluation in a policy field. Based on the analysis, we
can argue that cooperative governance may increase the need for accountability, since the par-
liamentary oversight is more difficult to fulfill (delegation) respectively more strongly needed
(legitimation). Second, the analysis also provides evidence that the closeness to science plays
an important role as an interacting variable. The closer a policy field is to science, the more
likely a MP will demand an evaluation. This finding is consistent with the literature on the use
of knowledge in the policy process, which proclaims that the attributes of the administrative
structure of a policy sector influences knowledge shifts (Radaelli, 1995; Daviter, 2015). Even
though MPs have incentives to demand an evaluation by the need for accountability in a policy
field, they might more likely submit a parliamentary request if they have the impression that
there are enough specialists that can provide evaluations.11
These findings are important for understanding parliamentary oversight across policy fields.
The study shows that not only institutional settings influence the level of accountability, but
also the nature of a policy field. Although individual attributes influence the MP’s probability
to demand evaluations, the effect for the policy fields’ attributes is still higher. Figure 4 illus-
trates that the effect for legitimation and delegation is stronger than for being a member in an
oppositional party. While a MP’s likelihood to demand an evaluation increased by 5.1% in the
interaction between delegation and science, the probability to demand an evaluation in a policy
field with a high need for legitimation increases to more than 26.5%. In contrast, the effects for
parliament experience, partisanship, or member of an oversight committee are all smaller, even
though significant.
However, the study has three limitations. First, most of the relevant data has been gathered
through a parliamentary survey. Although this approach provides a comprehensive overview
of the parliamentary demand for evaluations, survey data always entails methodical problems
that question the analytical power of the sample (Author et al. 2016). In doing so, problems
of self-selection and misreporting are likely to appear, even if the measurement errors should be
distributed equally across the policy fields. Second a generalization of policy fields’ attributes is
11However, it is also argued in literature that science may potentially raise more conflicts of interest and thus
lead to more parliamentary oversight, respectively to a higher evaluation demand (Brown, 2009). Though, the
attributes science and conflictivity do not correlate with each other (see Table 4).
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men, membership in an oversight committee and in the parliament board. All other individual and parliamentary
variables are at the median.
challenging. It is unclear whether the policy fields’ attributes are constant over the cantonal and
the federal level, since there are no studies investigating this problem. Last and most important,
the concepts delegation and legitimation might correlate with each other, which the empirical
measurement indeed suggests. For instance, public services might especially be delegated in
those policy fields in which the need for legitimation is particularly high, since the agencies want
to implement the policies with the most important stakeholders in policy networks. Moreover,
policy fields that are particularly close to science might receive more parliamentary oversight,
as they are the ones most likely to be delegated to non-state actors and have a higher need for
legitimation.
7 Implications for Other Countries and Oversight Institutions
Although the political system certainly has some particularities, the Swiss case is by far not
disentailed from other countries. The use of parliamentary requests as an oversight tool can
also be observed in other countries, as discussed in section 3. Moreover, several studies recently
showed that evaluations are also frequently demanded by other parliaments (Speer, Pattyn and
De Peuter, 2015; Zwaan, van Voorst and Mastenbroek, 2016). However, this does not mean
that the findings of the analysis can simply be generalized, but that the dynamics detected in
Switzerland should not be understated as the product of a specific context.
First of all, all parliaments have incentives for parliamentary oversight in temporary democ-
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racies. Previous studies have shown that the MPs want to control the executive due to the chain
of delegation. This is not only true for parliamentary democracies (Saalfeld, 2000; Strøm, Müller
and Bergman, 2006), but also for countries with presidential systems (Kiewiet and McCubbins,
1991). Furthermore, several studies show that MPs attempt to oversee the executive regardless
of their oversight institutions (Yamamoto, 2007; Winzen, 2012). However, although parliamen-
tary requests and questions might be widely used as an oversight tool in other countries, their
use might still differ according to the context of countries Rozenberg et al. (2011).
Countries differ not only in how the have institutionalized their parliaments, but also in how
they implement their policies. On the one hand, parliaments might have other instruments for
parliamentary oversight. In contrast to Switzerland, those institutions for parliamentary over-
sight could either focus on other oversight mechanisms or have better resources for monitoring
and reporting. On the other hand, the way of how policies are implemented might vary signifi-
cantly across countries. As a consequence, policy networks might be more strongly developed in
some countries than in others. However, these different settings do not change the mechanism of
how attributes of policy fields shape parliamentary oversight. Even if MPs use other instruments
(committees, hearings etc.) in order to control the government, they will still rather focus on
those policy fields, which have a higher need for accountability. Several studies suggest that
MPs focus on specific policy fields for accountability reasons. While Winzen (2013) shows how
European integration has an influence on national oversight institutions, since governmental
parliamentary groups want to enhance policy participation, Den Boer, Hillebrand and Nölke
(2008) demonstrate that security policies are less investigated by the European Parliament, as
the field raises fewer legitimacy concerns.
Hence, the findings of this article can be applicable to other countries with other oversight
mechanisms. More particularly, there are three different implications for other countries. First,
parliaments can have weak oversight institutions, but their members might still find a way to
fulfill their oversight function. The Swiss case illustrates how MPs use parliamentary requests
in order to oversee the agencies. Second, policy fields differ in their attributes as they do not
only have to deal with different policies, but they also implement them in varied ways. While
some fields delegate more policies to private organizations, other policy fields lack in political
legitimation. This does not mean that these attributes converge across countries. Other coun-
tries - depending on their institutional and traditional settings - might have another distribution
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of those attributes across the policy fields. Third, those attributes have a significant influence
on the need of accountability. Hence, in many countries MPs will have a distinct perception
of what policy areas should be overseen more intensively than others. The findings presented
in this article suggest that the effects of policy fields’ attributes on parliamentary oversight are
diverse, but clearly observable.
8 Conclusion
The article offers empirical evidence that parliaments execute their oversight task variably across
policy fields. In doing so, the analysis shows that MPs interpret their oversight role differently,
since they demand evaluations more frequently in some policy fields than in others. In those
policy fields where more public activities are delegated to private organizations, MPs are more
likely to demand an evaluation. The same is true if the need for legitimation is particularly high
in a policy field. Both effects increase with the policy field’s closeness to science.
The findings contribute to the literature on accountability, parliamentary oversight, as well
as comparative public policy. First, the analysis highlights the importance of distinguishing
between different levels of accountability across policy fields. It is evident that we should study
the nature of policy fields and how their attributes affect accountability. Second, the findings
highlight the importance of studying parliamentary oversight across policy fields, since policy
fields vary in their level of accountability. Using the example of policy evaluation, the study
provides an example that parliaments execute their oversight function unequally across policy
fields. Last and most important, the article has important implications for comparative public
policy literature. In the 1970s, Lowi (1972) already argued that policies determine politics. He
argues that not the actual outcomes, but the expectations on what the outcomes can be, influence
the decision-making process. In contrast to Lowi, this study shows that policy can also influence
the political actors, since they execute oversight differently. Hence, the article contributes to
public policy literature by using a comparative approach to understand differences of policy
fields. Although in-depth studies on the specific policy sectors are important, a systematic
comparison between the policy fields must be made in order to advance public policy research.
These findings therefore point to the potential of policy fields’ attributes for public pol-
icy research. Although the importance of policy fields are not new in public policy research
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2010), many scholars have so far neglected the influence of policy
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fields’ attributes on politics and have only given attention to institutional differences of policy
areas. Although the Swiss case has some peculiarities, the study has important implications for
other parliaments, since parliamentary oversight can be characterized by various institutions.
Depending on the perceived need of accountability, these focus on different policy fields. Further
research yet needs to explore how policy fields’ attributes develop and how they shape politics.
I believe this study provides a helpful starting point for such research.
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Appendix
Table 2: Definition of Policy Fields
Policy Fields Specification
State People, Political Institutions, Cantons, Municipalities,Church
Education School System, Sciences, Research, Culture
Security/Foreign Affairs Military, Civil Defense, Police, International Relations
Public Finances Taxes, Subsidies, Cuts
Energy Electricity, Water Power, Nuclear Energy,Renewable Energy
Infrastructure Building, Housing, Environment, TelecommunicationPrivate and Public Transport, Spacial Planning
Health Healthcare Provision, Food, Veterinary,Health Promotion and Prevention
Welfare Familiy, Social Insurance, Social Assistance
Economy Labor, Services, Industry, Trade, Craft, Agriculture,Forestry
Justice/Migration Civil and Criminal Law, Immigration, Asylum,Integration, Naturalization
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Table 3: Definition of Policy Fields’ attributes
Attribute Definition
Delegation Delegation is an act where an administration unit that is responsible for
a public service delegates the execution of the public service to a private
organization.
Legitimacy Legitimation is the moral conviction that an administration unit
produces public activities, which are valid and eligible to solve a social
problem.
Conflictivity The level of conflict reflects the degree of incompatibility of basic beliefs
of competing coalitions over policy goals in a policy field.
Science Closeness to science describes in what extent scientific research deals
with issues of a policy field.
Salience Salience of a policy field is the quantity of attention, which policy issues
of a policy field get from external actors and how these actors value
the need for action that has to be taken in a policy field.
Table 4: Covariance Matrix of Policy Fields’ Attributes
Variable Delegation Legitimation Salience Conflictivity Science
Delegation 1.000
Legitimation 0.769 1.000
Salience 0.270 0.551 1.000
Conflictivity 0.209 0.565 0.950 1.000
Science 0.830 0.636 0.210 0.169 1.000
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Table 5: Operationalization of the Variables




In the last four years, in which policy fields did you
propose a parliamentary request in order to examine
a state measure with regard to implementation and





On a scale from 1 to 10, where do you position the
extent of delegated public services in the following
policy fields during the last four years?





On a scale from 1 to 10, where do you position
the need to legitimate public activities in the following
policy fields during the last four years?





On a scale from 1 to 10, where do you position the
salience of the following policy fields during the last
four years? Continuous scale, standardized:




On a scale from 1 to 10, where do you position the
level of conflict in the following policy fields during
the last four years? Continuous scale, standardized:




On a scale from 1 to 10, where do you position the
closeness to science of the following policy fields
during the last four years? Continuous scale,




Public Expenditure of a Policy Field




Variable Operationalization Source ER HYP
Individual Level




Sex Dummy: 0 for male, 1 for female Parliament
Survey
Education
What is your highest degree of education?
Continuous scale:




Party membership in a center party (FDP.
The Liberals, Christian Democratic People’s Party,
Green Liberal Party, Conservative Democratic Party,
Christian Social Party, Evangelical People’s Party




Party membership in an oppositional party





How many years of experience do you have in a




Membership Board Membership in the parliament office
Dummy: 0 for no, 1 for yes
Parliament
Survey
Oversight Committee Membership in an oversight committee




Index of three dimensions:
- During the last four years, how many times did
you read an evaluation summary?
- Evaluations are a useful instrument for me as a
member of parliament.
- Whenever possible, my political decisions
are supported by evaluation or other studies.
Categorial scale: 1 (never/strongly disagree) -




Size of Parliament Size of parliament
Continuous scale Badac 2011, supp.
Evaluation Clause
General evaluation clause in the cantonal/federal
constitution
Dummy: 0 for no, 1 for yes
Horber 2007, supp.
Institutional Position




ER = Expected relationship; HYP = Hypothesis corroborated (C) or proven false (F); supp = Data supplemented
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